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DIVISIONAL REPORTING BY DIVERSIFIED
CORPORATIONS: A BUSINESSMAN'S VIEW
THEODORE H. SILBERT*
Few issues in the field of corporate finance have been more contro-
versial in recent years than the question of complete disclosure of revenues
and earnings in terms of specific dollars-and-cents amounts by separate
units of diversified companies. Relative importance of various divisions
to overall corporate performance has long been a matter of concern to
internal managements and analysts. Until recently this information has
been closely guarded and available only to the Securities and Exhange
Commission (SEC) at the time of filing securities registration statements.
As a matter of fact, filing of such information was not actually re-
quired until new amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 became effective
on August 14, 1969.1 These amendments, announced after some four years
of deliberation, provide that a company engaged in more than one busi-
ness activity must disclose the approximate amount or percentage of total
sales and operating revenues and of contributions to income before in-
come taxes and extraordinary items attributable to each business line for
all fiscal years subsequent to December 31, 1966.
Companies with total sales and revenues of more than $50 million
must submit breakdowns for each line of business contributing more than
10 percent to operating revenues or income, or resulting in a loss of
10 percent or more. For companies with annual sales of less than $50
million, the benchmark level is 15 percent of profits or sales (or losses)
instead of 10 percent. If the percentage factor, applied to both sales and
earnings contributions, results in more than 10 lines of business, disclosure
may be limited to what the company considers its 10 most important lines.
Where it is not possible to break down the contribution to income before
taxes and extraordinary items for any business line, the contribution to
operational results most closely approaching such income must be dis-
closed, accompanied by an explanation why the company cannot state the
income contributions.
At first reading, these amendments present no insurmountable prob-
lems. However, the SEC rules prescribe no guidelines as to what constitutes
a "line of business." Nor will the SEC define the term. Appropriate con-
sideration, it was suggested, should be given all relevant factors, includ-
ing rates and profitability of operations, degrees of risk and opportunity
for growth. But discretion becomes that of management, according to the
SEC release, to define a reporting pattern in line with a company's par-
ticular operations and responsive to its organizational concept. A descrip-
* Chairman of the Board, Standard Prudential Corporation.
1 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1969, at 20.
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tion of the basis for grouping products into a particular line must be
given, however, and changes in product lines between reporting periods
described.
The revised form, in general, continues existing disclosure require-
ments on breakdown of total volume of sales and revenues by principal
classes of similar products or services. At present, however, this breakdown
can be expressed only in terms of sales percentage and does not have to
include contributions to net income.
The new SEC rules have actually been anticipated by some companies
which have made public sales breakdowns of their various components
by category. A study in 1968 by the Financial Executives Institute, for
instance, showed that 48 percent of 457 publicly-owned companies sur-
veyed reported contributions to gross sales made by division, major mar-
kets, geographical areas (domestic), product lines or operating groups. 2
But these breakdowns, while significant in view of an absence of such
practice a few years ago, customarily cover broad product categories-
such as "consumer," "industrial," or "government" -without indicating
which internal units were responsible for such sales or losses. Such group-
ings arbitrarily selected by management tend to mask individual profits
and losses of subsidiaries and divisions.
Regardless of any deficiencies in current rules and practices, the SEC
now wants to apply such criteria to the detailed annual financial reports
publicly-held companies must submit to. The agency gave "interested
parties" (until November 23, 1969) an opportunity to comment on the
changes, but there seems little doubt that the present disclosure rules
will soon become effective for all such annual reports to the agency.
What is behind the current movement to disclose more? According
to Financial Executive,
it is partly the result of pressure exerted on corporate management by
stock analysts, financial institutions, shareholder groups, and, to some
degree, the firm's own public accountants. In addition, a number of pro-
fessional organizations, including Financial Executives Institute (and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants), have supported the
principle of additional voluntary disclosure of financial information by
corporations.3
The most pointed pressure has been exerted by the SEC,
which has, in numerous statements, articles and speeches by its personnel,
campaigned for greater voluntary disclosure by publicly owned corporations.
During this time the SEC has repeatedly noted that if such information
2 Hobgood, Voluntary Disclosure in 1968 Annual Reports, 37 FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE,
May 1969, at 64.
3 Savoie, Financial Communication: The Public's Right to Know, 36 FINANCIAL Ex-
ECUTIVE, Dec. 1968, at 21.
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were not disclosed voluntarily, formal rulings might well be issued which
would require corporations to show financial information in the report to
shareholders. 4
Thus far, the SEC's rules, as indicated above, apply only to certain
registration statements filed with the Commission. But the SEC continues
to study whether and to what extent similar disclosure requirements should
also be applied to periodic reports. A recent study (the Wheat Report)
which the Commission issued urges that these requirements be extended
to the annual 10-K reports filed by corporations with the SEC.5 Tradi-
tionally, the 10-K report requirements are regarded as harbingers of later
revised requirements for stockholder reports, since the SEC normally re-
quires that reports sent to shareholders not differ materially from those
filed with it.
Both the amended regulations to date as well as hints of future and
stronger disclosure requirements have stimulated considerable resistance
among top managements of many diversified companies. Some state pri-
vately that the relative planned obscurity of their financial statements
help protect them from "stupid but embarrassing" questions at annual
meetings. Other more serious objectors complain that such full disclosure
would:
1. Help competitors, especially those in businesses with a high rate
of new product development;
2. Involve too many wild guesses to be meaningful to investors; and,
3. Cost overwhelming amounts of accounting time.
The reluctance to disclose such profit data is widespread; only 9
percent of the companies queried in the Financial Executives Institute
survey did so in their 1967 annual reports.6 Yet, were any subsidiaries
(some of which functioned previously as public corporations) still filing
reports, they would have been compelled to indicate sales and profits to
their shareholders in their annual reports.
Admittedly, it is necessary to assign costs such as taxes, interest and
overhead which are normally carried by the corporation as a whole rather
than by any single group or division. For example, two divisional man-
agers of an east coast bus company complained that each was claiming
his division was "carrying" the other. The argument surrounded alloca-
tion of 'overhead costs for a terminal used by both divisions. Should the
cost be-divided in proportion to the revenue brought in by each division?
Should it be based on the amount of space used by each? Or should it be
determined for each division by calculating what the costs would be if
the other division ceased to "o-erate? While initial accounting studies pro-
4 Hobgood, supra note 2.
5 Id.
6 ld. at 65.
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duced wildly varying results, a final study coordinated with management
settled the dispute amicably. A simple solution would be to show opera-
tions of each subsidiary before taxes as though each subsidiary was func-
tioning as an independent entity.
Diversified companies which are highly decentralized generally have
fewer problems allocating such overhead costs. For several years, Textron,
Inc., Providence, Rhode Island, an original multi-market company, has
been breaking down sales and pre-tax profits of each of its four operating
groups -aerospace, consumer products, industrial goods and metal prod-
ucts. Since the corporate headquarters numbers only 100 people and the
company conducts no large interdivisional sales, most costs can be readily
allocated to a single operation.7 The exception is taxes, which Textron
absorbs as a corporate expense.
On the competitive side, one large conglomerate manufactures prod-
ucts which have profit margins ranging from 2 percent to 52 percent.8
Once the high profit items become well known, the company can be in
trouble from two sources-large customers and competitors. Customers
could demand price reductions or threaten to cancel orders. Competitors
can know precisely where to strike for new business. These are "warmed
over" arguments against disclosure which were used unsuccessfully in 1933
when the principle of full disclosure and the SEC were first established.
In another instance, a president of a diversified company complains
that the new reporting guidelines would reveal its sales and profit data
to a larger competitor, while what the competitor discloses would be of
little value. His company makes a computer which is responsible for more
than 10 percent of its sales. He thinks International Business Machines
(IBM) probably sells three times as many of its similar computer-but
that product comprises much less than 10 percent of IBM's sales, Under
the regulations, IBM would learn all about its smaller competitor which
would find out nothing about IBM.
Although it is true that competitive pressures may be brought on
certain companies operating under the new rules, the settling effect of
market changes should serve to equalize any disbalances which may tem-
porarily occur. At any rate, the SEC, which must itself be vigilant against
stimulating "unfair competition," indicates it is not very concerned about
corporate complaints that the new rules will result in profit-cutting com-
petition.9 Here we are confronted with a choice between "cartelism" and
the private enterprise system which competition has made successful in
the United States.
Adherence to the new SEC guidelines will require, perhaps, concen-
7 TEXTRON, INC., 1967 ANNUAL REPORT (1968).
8 L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § F, at 1, col. 1.
9 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 1969, at 18, col. 3.
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trated review of a company's accounting procedures, but many corporate
executives and auditors do not believe there is any justification for the
belief that the required breakdowns will result in wild guesses or mis-
leading information. Initially, of course, accounting costs will be higher
than under previous practices which did not disclose divisional sales, costs
and earnings. The cost of accounting as required under full disclosure
rules is the weakest argument mustered.
Objections of diversified companies to such full disclosure as the SEC
and other organizations now recommend seem based on pre-1933 rationale
which may either be obsolete or, occasionally, perhaps intentionally mis-
leading. While those most heartily campaigning for dollars-and-cents dis-
closure - the financial community and those associated with it - are met
with hard-line negative reasons opposing such moves, the fact remains
that those most intimately affected, the shareholders, have received little
consideration in the controversy.
It is my personal conviction, and that of the management of our com-
pany, that since we must disclose such detailed information in registration
statements, we should also share this information with the stockholder
members of our own family. We do not feel that such public unveiling
of heretofore hidden corporate financial figures can do other than rein-
force stockholder loyalty and indicate to the financial community that we
live in a goldfish bowl and we are happy with our environment.
Through the complete and precise departmental disclosures included
in Standard Prudential Corporation's 1969 Annual Report, for instance,
we are attempting to make possible an accurate, meaningful evaluation of
the progress and profitability of each unit by shareholders, analysts, port-
folio managers and the financial press.
In so doing, we believe we are pioneering even beyond current and
anticipated requirements. That means, to date only detailed breakdowns
of sales volume and profits by any substantial diversified company have
been reported in percentages by constituent groups or industry categories
but not in dollars and cents of each individual subsidiary or division of
importance. Thus, groupings are made under such broad and vague head-
ings as "consumer" or "industrial." In practice, this has appeared to be
a somewhat radical departure from previous practice. Actually, however,
a corporation can hide poor performance of one or more subsidiaries on
low or negative contribution to profitability under such a blanket head-
ing which, in total, becomes a composite financial facade.
Thus, it was with some true sense of corporate satisfaction that we
read in the Wall Street Journal on October 9, 1969, that, "Standard Pru-
dential Corporation lifted a traditional corporate veil in its annual report
for fiscal 1969, disclosing detailed dollar results of its nine separate units." 10
10 Id., Oct. 9, 1969, at 36, col. 4.
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It stated that we believed, "the breakdown is the most complete ever re-
ported by a large, diversified corporation."11
Similar tributes from the financial press have been received in increas-
ing numbers since publication of our annual report. Our constructive
disclosure action was taken neither as a novelty nor in anticipation of
more stringent SEC regulations possibly to come. On the contrary, we
took this move after long deliberation of the consequences both to Stan-
dard Prudential as a corporation, to the whole area of publicly-held com-
panies and for the benefit of our shareholders and financial analysts.
We had to consider negatives, of course. Our overall net sales increased
to $104.7 million, with a net income of $4.2 million, or 49 cents a share,
from sales of $106.8 million, and a net of $3.8 million, or 26 cents a share
for the previous fiscal year.12 At the same time, however, two of our sep-
arate units suffered losses in fiscal 1969. Fabrics by Joyce, Inc., lost $1,168
on sales of more than $18 million. United Communications, Inc., lost
$23,610 on revenues of $2.3 million.13
We thus reported that, while our net income had increased appreciably
over the previous year, we had two sore spots about which, in all corporate
candor, we were compelled to inform our shareholders. Naturally, remedial
measures have already been put into effect, as our first quarter statement
for fiscal 1970 indicated. Yet we felt we had no other recourse but to report
which of our nine subsidiaries were making money and which were losing.
Reaction to implementation of our full disclosure policy has been
uniformly favorable. Wall Street circles, the press, a former important
official of the SEC and, best of all, our own shareholders have applauded
this move to keep them better informed about the progress of the company.
We hope this innovation will be rapidly adopted by other large diver-
sified companies so that investment decisions and evaluations of corpora-
tions may be made wisely and prudently. When I refer to other large diver-
sified corporations, I have in mind companies that are not necessarily
defined as "conglomerates" but nevertheless operate many subsidiaries or
divisions engaged in businesses unrelated to the original single product
by which they were originally identified. Such corporations are among
the top hundred companies in the United States.
11 STANDARD PRUDENTIAL CORP., 1969 ANNUAL REPORT at 1 (1970).
12 Id. at 8.
13 Id.
